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The Paradox of Religion: The
(re)Construction of Hindu and Muslim
Identities amongst South Asian
Diasporas in the United States
Aminah Mohammad-Arif
1 This paper1 explores issues of identity reconstruction and community formation among
South Asians in a given diasporic context, the United States. It focuses more specifically
on the relationships between Hindus and Muslims, as this issue is of particular interest
for several reasons. First, their numbers have dramatically increased over the years ever
since  they  first  migrated  in  the  wake  of  the  liberalization of  American immigration
policies in the 1960s: according to the 2000 census, Indians are estimated to be around 1.7
million in the US, of which about 65% were Hindus, hence a lower proportion than that in
India,2 and 10% to 15% were Muslims. For Pakistanis, the figures vary between 400, 000 to
600, 000. South Asian migrants in the United States thus consist of a population which
may not be as visible as that of  Great-Britain,  but which indeed represents a sizable
minority. 
2 Second, at the socio-economic level, Indians and Pakistanis have so far been known for
being highly educated, successful and prosperous, as a result of the American policy of
the  1960s  and  1970s,  which  promoted  the  immigration  of  educated  and  qualified
populations.3 They are hence counted amongst the most educated and affluent migrants
in comparison both with other ethnic minorities in the United States, and with other
South Asian diasporas. 
3 Third,  the  South  Asian  population  is  characterized  by  a  remarkable  overlapping  of
identities;  yet,  there  are  perceptible  trends  of  homogenization  along  religious  lines,
Hindus vs Muslims, generating a polarization within the group caught by the tension and
contradictions  between  its  internal  diversity  and  the  appeals  made  by  respective
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leaderships in favour of greater homogeneity amongst the Hindus on the one hand, and
the Muslims on the other.
4 Last but not least, the case of the United States is also particularly interesting given its
specific  definition  of  multiculturalism  and  the  implications  this  has  on  inter-ethnic
relationships. It should be first borne in mind that as compared to France where the
migrant is expected to individually assimilate into the host-society, the United States is a
country which has been promoting a policy of so-called multiculturalism (Lacorne 1997,
Sabbagh  2004,  Taylor  1992)  since  the  early  1990s.  This  policy  is  officially  meant  to
celebrate ethnic diversity, of those, in particular, who had been so far marginalized. But
the insistence on ethno-cultural differences, instead of building bridges between ‘people
of  colour’,  has  had  the  effect  of  exacerbating  ethnic  differences,  as  the  policy  of
multiculturalism incites  individuals  to  organize  into  groups  on  the  basis  of  cultural
similarity  and  encourages  ethnic  leaders  to  speak  for  the  entire  community;  it  has
primarily brought about a reinforcing of group boundaries not only between migrant
groups  but  between  migrant  groups  and  non-migrant  minority  groups  as  well,  like
African-Americans.  Besides,  multiculturalism  is  to  be  understood  in  the  general
framework of American ethnic policy based on racial identification. Hence, this policy is
such that individual members of ethnic groups are encouraged to identify themselves as
part of ‘pre-defined’ communities by the official classifications already in place. This is
best illustrated by the way the census categories have been set up: along racial lines. 
5 The strengthening and deepening of boundaries, which tend to create cleavages between
ethnic groups, occasionally lead to violence as in the case of the infamous Los Angeles
riots of 1992, which primarily opposed African-Americans to Korean shopkeepers.4 As far
as South Asians are concerned, they had been targeted as a community in 1993 in New
Jersey by Hispanic gangs known as the Dotbusters (in reference to the red bindi worn by
Hindu women on their foreheads). Most of these tensions and violence take place in a
context of  economic and political  competition but tend in many cases,  like in Great-
Britain, to oppose ‘communities’  rather than ‘individuals’.  As rightfully underlined by
Denis Lacorne: ‘the basic unit of the democratic nation is not the individual but the ethnic
community’ (Lacorne 1997).
6 Another significant related feature governing relationships between communities in the
US  is  discrimination.  A  salient  characteristic  of  the  American  ethnic landscape,
discrimination plays  a  major  role  in  the  formation of  group-boundaries.  Apart  from
occasional incidents (usually opposing them to other ‘communities of colour’ rather than
to whites) as in the examples seen above, South Asians as an ethnic group have not been
the major targets of racist attacks, especially if we compare the case to that of Britain.
They nonetheless suffer from a feeling of discrimination as ‘people of colour’ (see below).
7 But can this reinforcing of group boundaries caused by the rhetoric of multiculturalism
and  discrimination  lead  to  a  greater  cohesion  within  a  given  ethnic  group?  Not
necessarily as shown by the case of South Asians whose biggest internal dividing line, as
we shall see, seems to be religion.
8 Except for a very interesting article by Prema Kurien (2001) on the relationships between
Hindu and Muslim Indians in Southern California (written before September 11),  this
subject has been largely understudied. Moreover, Prema Kurien has restricted her study
to the case of Indian migrants without addressing Pakistani migrant population here, at
all.
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9 In this paper, I first examine how Hindus and Muslims (the latter including Indians as
well  as  Pakistanis,  even if  distinctions between both groups will  be  made,  whenever
needed) have reconstructed their respective identities in the United States, in the New
York region in particular, and during this process the importance they give to religion.
Keeping in mind the specificity of the American context, I then study the implications of
such a reformulation on their relationships, and finally the movements supporting the
bridging of borders in favour of the emergence of a South Asian identity in the diaspora.
 
Religion, a salient factor in identity reconstruction
10 Several  reasons  can  be  cited  to  explain  the  salience  of  religion  in  the  identity
reconstruction of Hindus and Muslims in the United States.  First of all,  the diasporic
experience to some extent creates the conditions for an exacerbation of the religious
sentiment, such that many immigrants ‘discover’ themselves as Hindus or Muslims when
living in the United States. An identity which was ‘taken for granted’ in the home-country
is renegotiated, reconstructed, reinterpreted in a somewhat more self-conscious way in
the United States. Immigrants are hence engaged in a complex process of ‘rationalizing’
their religious practices, this implying a shift in understanding fundamental beliefs as
much more emphasis is put on individual initiatives and formal rules than has been the
case for most people in the Subcontinent.5 
11 In an alien environment, religion can also be endorsed with a cathartic role: it may help
individuals  who  have  been  socially  and  culturally  marginalized  and  psychologically
destabilized by the diasporic experience to exorcize their fears and frustrations and to
find landmarks. In such a context, mosques and temples are no longer mere spaces of
prayer; they become major spaces of socialization, in the same way as were churches and
synagogues for earlier immigrants (and as they still are for recent ones) of other origins,
and play a crucial role in community formation. Hence, it is estimated that there are
more than one thousand mosques in the United States,6 more than 200 Hindu temples
already built and about one thousand new temples under construction. There is hence a
‘frenetic’  building  of  religious  edifices,  which,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  is  also  a  way for
immigrants to make their marks on the American ethnic landscape. This has resulted into
a ‘confessionnalization’ of space. Most immigrant groups have gone through this process,
regardless of their religious, national or ethnic affiliations. Hence, Irish, Greeks or Jews
have  all  seen  religion  as  a  salient  vector  in  the  formation  of  communities  and  the
reshaping of ethnic identities both at the individual and collective level.7
12 The arrival of children and especially their maturation also plays a major role in the
process. It causes serious anxiety amongst the parents who fear that their offspring will
acculturate and hence call into question their authority. They worry about the fact that
an ‘excessive’ Americanization might engender a rupture between the youths and their
families and/or urge them to enter into exogamous marriages. As a palliative measure,
parents devote all their energies to ensure that their cultural and religious heritage will
be properly transmitted to their children. In the process, religion is perceived by many
parents as the most efficient means to curb the effects of acculturation (Mohammad-Arif
2006).
13 Last but not least, a number of transnational movements have taken advantage of these
feelings of discrimination, disruption, and identity quest to exert on immigrants a certain
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influence and to impose on them homogenous and exclusionist versions of Hinduism and
Islam. On the Muslim side, one organization that has been particularly instrumental in
this is the Jama’at-i Islami (JI), or Islamic Party. Founded by Abul Ala Maududi in 1941, it
is a fundamentalist organization par excellence in the sense that it advocates the return
to the ‘original’ Islamic doctrine, and promotes the idea that Islam should regulate every
aspect of social life. The aim of the Party is to infiltrate the political and social spheres,
the ultimate objective being the establishment of  an Islamic State.  The JI  has indeed
played a crucial role in the Islamization of the State in Pakistan. On the Hindu side, the
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), or the Universal Hindu Association, created in 1964 in
India to promote Hindu religion, has been particularly active in promoting the Hindutva
(Hinduness) agenda in the US. It views India as an exclusively Hindu society and militates
in favour of a Hindu State. It propagates the idea of a Vedic Golden Age that ended with
the presumed oppression of Muslim rule, followed by British colonization. Hence, a major
dimension of its rhetoric is based on the hostility to the Other, Muslims but also (Indian)
Christians seen as resident aliens. 
14 South Asian Muslims migrated to the United States at a time when Islamic ‘revivalism’
was on the rise throughout the world. Students in particular were under the influence of
major fundamentalist thinkers like Maududi. Some of them migrated to the US from the
1960s  onwards and played a  significant  role  in setting up Islamic institutions  in the
United States.  As  early  as  1963,  they created the Muslim Student  Association (MSA),
which was to become the largest organization of Muslim students in the US. Established
as a well  organized network, the MSA spread its activities to all  the major American
campuses.  In the continuation of the activities of the MSA, another organization was
created, targeting not only students but migrants as well:  the Islamic Circle of North
America, which is the actual branch of the Jama’at-i Islami in the US. ICNA was formally
established in 1971 by a group of Pakistani students who wanted to launch an Islamic
movement in North America that would ‘help’ migrants to lead their lives as Muslims.
15 In  India,  the  RSS,  the  ideological  matrix  of  the  Hindu nationalist  movement  and its
affiliates are, through the Vidhyarthi Parishad (the student wing), equally active in Indian
universities,  including  in  the  most  famous  ones.8 Several  degree-holders  of  these
universities migrated to the US during the last three decades.9 The VHP(A) was created in
1970, one year before ICNA, and has established branches all over North America. It is
part of a network which includes the Overseas Friends of BJP, the Hindu Swayam Sewak
Sangh (HSS) which is the American equivalent of the RSS, and the Hindu Student Council
(HSC) which is represented in several American universities.
16 The  BJP  and  VHP  have  established  themselves  in  most  countries  where  significant
numbers of Indians have settled; however, as Hindus in the US enjoy a particularly high
level  of  economic  success,  they  have  always  been  prime  targets.  The  Sangh Parivar
(network of nationalist Hindu organizations) has apparently reached its aim since it is
now a well-known fact that Indian Americans extensively donate funds to Hindutva causes
both in India and in the US (Prashad 2000: 146, Mathew & Prashad 2000), this goes well in
the logic  of  long-distance nationalism as  defined by Benedict  Anderson (1998:  74).  A
report  documented in  much detail  by  South Asia  Citizens  Web based in  France  and
Sabrang  Communications  based  in  India  showed  the  close  links  between  the  India
Development and Relief Fund and the Sangh Parivar, though IDRF had always pretended
to be non-sectarian and independent. The report hence revealed that much of the IDRF’s
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money was used to support Hindutva organizations and sectarian Hindu charities that
may or may not have a direct connection with the Sangh Parivar.
17 Interestingly, there are striking resemblances in the policies promoted by the JI and the
VHP, though they do not seem to be influencing each other but rather have parallel
trajectories. First, in addition to the initial role played by the students on both sides and
the fact that both take advantage of the disruption caused by the diasporic experience,
the VHP and the JI target more particularly the second generation, who as Americanized
as they may be, often go through periods of identity quests; this ‘search for roots’ may
make them even more vulnerable than their parents, all the more so as some of them
have been exposed since their childhood to the discourses of the VHP and the JI without
necessarily having the means for a critical distance. Hence, most of the summer camps,
which can welcome very young children, are controlled by the VHP on the one side and
(to a lesser extent, as we will see below) by the JI and its avatars on the other, while
youth-oriented programmes (like essay competitions on the life of Vivekananda for
young Hindus and the life of the Prophet for young Muslims) constitute a major part of
the activities designed for children.
18 Second,  both the  JI  and the  VHP use  the  language  of  minority  rights,  plurality  and
multiculturalism  to  plead  for  integration  into  the  American  mainstream.  And
interestingly, they both try in the process to show the similarities of Islam and Hinduism
with Judaism and Christianity.
19 The other major common point between these two movements is the respectable image
that both have managed to project: the JI as well as the VHP have been successful in
transforming  their  image  of  a  fundamentalist  movement  into  that  of  a  respectable
organization whose sole objective is supposedly to offer immigrants the means to keep
their cultural and religious identity in non-Hindu and non-Muslim lands.
20 There are however significant differences between both organizations. First, it is not the
JI as such which has managed to portray itself as a ‘decent’ organization, but it is ICNA,
since many immigrants are not aware of the fact that ICNA is a branch of the JI;  the
mention of the JI itself usually generates sentiments of rejection among immigrants. Yet
ICNA’s organization is almost exactly modelled on the lines of the JI,10 and it continues to
propagate  the  same ultra-conservative  message  (the  kind of  messages  that  Christian
fundamentalists  would  easily  identify  with,  like  the  denunciation  of  adultery,
homosexuality, abortion, and so on). As for the VHP, it has simply become the VHP-A, and
hence there is no room for doubt about its identity. However, it should be noted that
many Hindu immigrants, and more particularly their children, are hardly aware of the
true nature of the VHP and other affiliate organizations in India (Prashad 2000); they
have  hardly  heard  about  their  extremist  drifts.  This  precisely  is  one  of  the  major
achievements of the VHP, as compared to the JI whose reputation as a fundamentalist
organization is known by a larger number of people. This has been however been less
true since the Gujarat riots, as the direct role of the Hindu nationalists had been highly
exposed on that occasion, including in the American media; but the infiltration of the
VHP in major Indian organizations, including in secular ones (Mazumdar 2003), is such
that its influence may remain strong for a while in the diaspora. Besides, we may wonder
whether now that the Hindu nationalists have been relatively on the decline in India (at
least at the national level), they may see expatriates as their ultimate source of large
support. At any rate, as we will see later, their unabated activism in the United States has
been recently illustrated by a controversy over textbooks in California. 
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21 Another major distinction between the VHP and ICNA as such in the United States is that
while the VHP has somewhat managed to exert a monopoly on the diasporic scene, ICNA
is faced with a larger competition, as other organizations and movements (that may be or
may not be influenced by the ideals of the JI) are equally if not more active (like ISNA, the
Islamic Society of North America, which was partly founded by people influenced by the
ideology  of  the  JI,  but  which cannot  be  considered as  a  direct  branch of  Maududi’s
movement, or like AMC, the American Muslim Council, a religio-political organization, or
even like CAIR, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, predominantly led by Arabs
and devoted to fighting discrimination against Muslims in the United States). Besides,
many South Asians see ICNA as primarily a Pakistani organization and not as a ‘globally’
Islamic one,  or  not  even as  a  truly South Asian one,  even though some Indians and
Bangladeshis are counted amongst its most active members. ICNA’s relative failure to
effectively  transcend  national  boundaries  hampers  to  some  extent  its  impact  on
immigrants (particularly on non-Pakistani ones) but even more so on the youths who,
especially those who go through a process of re-Islamization, are particularly keen to
transcend ethno-national barriers. 
22 Last but not least, let us bear in mind that since Hinduism is primarily an Indian religion
this makes the monopoly exerted by the VHP on the diasporic scene easier, as religion
and ethnicity more or less merge into one (even if not all Indians are Hindu, Hindus are
usually  Indian11).  This  conflation of  religion and ethnicity  can also  be  useful  on the
American public scene as, regardless of the salience of religion seen as an acceptable
vector  for  community  formation,  the  officially  recognized  category  for  (political)
mobilization in the United States is the national one, hence the merging of ‘Hindu’ and
‘Indian’  into one will  be all  the more eagerly promoted by Hindutva-oriented leaders.
Besides, in order to gain better visibility in the host-society, Hindus need to put forward a
unified image of the community in the public sphere, and for this they need to overcome
their regional diversity and homogenize their different traditions. Though Hindus remain
highly divided along various fault-lines (see below), one of the major aims of the VHP’s
agenda is precisely to try to homogenize and unify the community. And they may have
been  more  successful  in  doing  so  in  the  diaspora  than  in  India.  The  attempts  at
homogenizing are also observed among Muslims. Immigration to the United States and
the contact with Muslims from different regions of the world has called into question the
legitimacy of South Asian Islamic traditions, as other groups view their own customs as
equally Islamic. Besides, the extreme diversity of the Muslim community is perceived as a
handicap  to  the  cohesion  of  the  group,  while  unity  is  viewed  as  vital  to  gain
representation and have access to resources in the American society. Hence, appeals of
the leadership to the believers to abandon their cultural baggage and focus only on text-
based rituals, as the Text is the ultimate reference that is likely to bind them beyond
cultural  particularities.  However,  as  compared  to  Hinduism,  Islam  is  a  highly
transnational religion, and as compared to UK where most Muslims are from the Indian
Subcontinent, South Asians in the United States are far from representing the dominant
group amongst Muslims.12 Hence, a (quasi)-exclusive control by any single organization
becomes much more difficult, even though, once again, the influence of the ideology of
the JI and its avatars over Muslims from the Subcontinent cannot be neglected or denied.
This  is  shown  by  the  kind  of  religious  revival  (support  in  particular  for  a more
scripturalist  form of  Islam,)  many South Asians,  irrespective of  their  national  origin,
experience after migrating to the US.13 Interestingly, as underlined by Prema Kurien, at a
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strictly organizational level, Indian Muslims, as compared to Indian Hindus, prefer to be
represented in secular organizations like AFMI, American Federation of Muslims from
India:  in  support  of  this  thesis,  one  of  the  main arguments  given by  Kurien is  that
emphasizing the fact that India is not exclusively Hindu but multireligious and hence
should  have  a  secular  government  is  the  only  way  to  counter  communally-oriented
organizations for groups like the Muslims (Kurien 2001: 283).
23 At any rate, it seems that in the United States the expression of a political Hinduism14 is
more developed than that of a political Islam (among South Asian immigrants at least).15
Beside  the  more  efficient  strategies  of  mobilization  of  the  Sangh  Parivar  and  the
arguments given above, the explanation probably lies also in the local context: political
Islam is more likely to foster fear and hostility among Americans, and hence Muslim
immigrants, who are first and foremost anxious to integrate and be well accepted by
American  society,  will  be  more  reluctant  to  claim  their  support  to  this  particular
expression of  Islam (even before  9/11),  whereas  political  Hinduism does  not  look as
threatening to the Americans,  and hence supporting it  is  not  deemed as  a  potential
hindrance to the process of integration of Hindu immigrants in the United States.
24 In addition to the endogenous factors cited above, more exogenous reasons also explain
why religion, rather than other ethnic markers, gets prominence: the local context plays
indeed a major role in the process, as religion occupies a significant place in the United
States. The First Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1791, guarantees religious
freedom in a way which can remind one more of Indian secularism, since it implies that
the State can show favour neither to the religious over the non-religious, nor to one
particular religious tradition over another. This is different from French laïcité, defined as
a strict separation between State and Church (though in both the American and French
cases religion is relegated to the private sphere). At any rate, Americans have the highest
rate  of  religious  practice  among  industrialized  countries,  as  shown  by  the  high
proportion of the population professing to a religion and being actively involved in it.
Moreover, despite the fact that religion is officially relegated to the private sphere, the
relationship between religion and State can be very ambiguous, as religion is seen as an
‘element  of  the  nationalist  paradigm’  (Marienstras  1997),  and  this  relationship  has
essentially been defined in Christian and to some extent Jewish terms (Herberg 1960). The
US has nonetheless been characterized by a tradition of relative religious freedom which
has  enabled  ‘new’  religious  minorities,  like  Hindus,  Muslims,  Sikhs,  Buddhists  to
‘transplant’  their  faiths  and  establish  organizations  (that  parallel  those  of  other
‘recognized’ religions).
25 At any rate, despite the freedom enjoyed by religious minorities, South Asians do suffer
from discrimination as mentioned above. But it is worth noting that Muslims and Hindus
experience it in different ways: many Muslims suffer from it at a two-fold level: as an
ethnic and as a religious minority. Hence the paradox of the situation: on the one hand,
American  relative  tolerance  in  religious  matters  enables  Muslims  to  practise  their
religion more or less freely and openly (at least till September 11). On the other hand,
anti-Islamic  prejudice  in  the  American  population,  which  is  fed  by  the  media  and
reinforced by international events, exacerbates the religious sentiment of some segments
amongst the Muslims, and in reaction— ‘reactive ethnicity’ (Barth 1969)—, they show a
stronger commitment to Islam. As for Hindus, even though some negative stereotypes
can be associated with Hinduism (often seen as a strange and primitive religion) as well,
they mostly experience discrimination as well as a sentiment of ostracism as an ethnic
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minority. Some find solace in reconstructing their identity not only along religious lines
but also by stressing the superiority of Hinduism over other religions, this giving them a
sentiment  of  pride  and  dignity.  On  university  campuses,  it  can  even  look  ‘cool’  for
students to claim that they are Hindus (which is not the case for Muslims) because of a
fairly romantic image associated with yoga, spirituality, ‘oriental’ religions, and so on
(Mazumdar 2003). Interestingly, this insistence on the Hindu identity was observed as
early as the beginning of the 20th century when a handful of Indians who were then living
in the US were fighting to obtain American citizenship: proving that one was white was
the main condition required at that time to qualify for citizenship. Indians argued that as
high-caste Hindus they belonged to the Aryan race, and by extension were Caucasians,
and therefore Whites. As a matter of fact, Sikhs, Muslims and Parsis did the same, as they
also tried to prove that they belonged to the Aryan race. At any rate, this shows how
much the local context of a given period can influence the self-definition of individuals
and groups. It should be also noted that in a country like Great-Britain the insistence on
the Hindu identity has been a way of  distinguishing oneself  from Muslims and from
Pakistanis in particular, especially after the Rushdie affair, and even more so since the
July 7th bomb attacks in London.16 But in the US, to put forward one’s Hindu identity, by
wearing the bindi for instance, is a way for some to differentiate themselves not only from
Muslims (as, at any rate, Americans can hardly distinguish between South Asians along
religious lines), but also from American Indians (because of a possible confusion over the
common terminology ‘Indian’) and Hispanics (with whom South Asians are frequently
confused because of physical resemblance) for questions not only pertaining to race but
to  social  class  as  well.  Similarly,  in  the  1910s  and  1920s,  Indians  (across  religious
affiliations)  would  wear  turbans  so  as  not  to  be  identified  with  African-Americans
(Mazumdar  2003).  Hence,  beyond  issues  of  religion,  race  and  class  can  be  equally
important in the self-definition and the image people want to project of themselves in the
host-society. 
 
The implications on inter-ethnic relations: between
separation and polarization
26 The  consequence  of  the  key  role  in  community-building  accorded  to  religion  by  a
substantial number of immigrants has been, not so surprisingly, the separation and/or
polarization between Hindus and Muslims. Given the importance taken by mosques and
temples as major places of socialization, Hindus and (Indian) Muslims have much fewer
opportunities to meet than in the Subcontinent. The lack of a common space of worship is
therefore a primary reason for the relative lack of contact between both groups: there are
no dargahs (shrines) ‘not the kind where a South Asian Muslim and a South Asian Hindu
would go together to obtain that special pleasure of communion or that equally special
comfort of a personal intercession with God.’ (Naim 1995: 4).
27 As for ‘cultural’ organizations, their formation has also been growingly symptomatic of
the separation and polarization between Indians and Pakistanis and especially between
Hindu Indians and Muslim Indians (as at any rate Pakistanis tended to form separate
organizations from the outset). In the 1960s and 1970s when the contemporary migration
process started, Indians, regardless of their religious affiliation, were still few in numbers
and tended to belong to the same associations. But from the 1980s onwards, as the South
Asian  population  grew  larger,  religious  minorities  progressively  left  these  original
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organizations,  as they increasingly perceived them as too ‘Hindu-dominated’  and not
truly  pan-Indian,  and set  up  their  own organizations.  While  Sikhs  primarily  left  for
political reasons (in the wake of the 1984 riots and the Khalistani movement in favour of
an independent Punjab), Muslims and Christians rather left for religious reasons, since
Hinduism  increasingly  became  an  important  feature  in  the  lives  of  Indian  cultural
associations (where sessions and events would start with a puja, for instance). The impact
of  the  VHP  on  Hindu  expatriates  reinforced  this  trend,  urging  non-Hindus  to  leave
organizations  labelled  ‘Indian’.  While  a  minority  joined  with  Pakistani  cultural
associations, most Indian Muslims decided to set up their own organizations, like the
already mentioned AFMI created in 1990.
28 Beyond mere separation, polarization as such has been triggered by particular events
taking place in the Subcontinent. The first such event, which represents a watershed in
the relationships between Hindus and South Asian, but more particularly Indian, Muslims
is  the  destruction  of  the Babri  mosque  in  Ayodhya.  Hindu  nationalists  claim  that
Ayodhya, a town in Uttar Pradesh, is the birthplace of Ram, and that the mosque, built by
the  first  Mughal  Emperor,  Babur  (1526-30)  was  erected  over  the  ruins  of  a  temple
dedicated to Ram. From 1989 onwards, the Hindu nationalists led a virulent campaign to
reclaim the site,  and on 6  December,  1992,  they destroyed the mosque.  It  is  a  well-
documented fact that the worldwide Hindu diaspora took part in this campaign from its
inception. Some of the bricks that were carried as symbols in a procession in Ayodhya
early  in  the  movement,  had been sent  to  India  from the United States,  Canada,  the
Caribbean and from South Africa. After the demolition of the Babri mosque, a segment of
Hindu immigrants  in  the  United  States  rejoiced over  the  event  and indulged in  the
apology of the Hindu nationalists. The following letter sent by an immigrant from New
York City to India Today is particularly enlightening:
Your issue on the Ayodhya aftermath (‘Smelling blood’ January 15) has upset me
immensely.  For  the past  45 years,  Hindus have been pushed to the wall  by the
deadly combination of Islamic fundamentalists, communists and pseudo-secularist
Hindus whose proclivity to belittle their heritage and damage the Hindu cause is
mind-boggling.  Now Hindus  are  in  no  mood to  take  anything  lying  down?  The
penchant for absurd exaggeration, cynical disregard for truth, vituperative attacks
on Hindu leaders, grossly libellous articles designed to vilify and discredit the BJP
and entire Hindu samaj smack of yellow journalism (India Today 1993: 6).
29 The founders of  the Federation of Hindu Associations (FHA),  one of the major Hindu
umbrella organizations, even claimed that they were inspired by the event when they
created their association in 1993 (Kurien 2001: 268).
30 As  for  Indian  Muslims,  the  event  and  the  widening  of  the  gap  between  the  two
communities  caused  them  to  be  more  pessimistic  about  the  situation  of  their
coreligionists in India. This pessimism often exaggerated well beyond reality is not only
the direct result of the Ayodhya affair, but is also an aftermath of a reinforced ethno-
religious sentiment exacerbated by the diasporic condition: those who have migrated do
not necessarily experience a weakening of their feeling of belonging to India, but may
become  hypersensitive  in  their  perception  of  the  vulnerability  of  the  minority
community  they  left  behind.  This  hypersensitivity  could  already  be  observed  in  the
country  of  origin  with  a  fairly  marked  propensity  amongst  Indian  Muslims  to
victimization. Their status as a vulnerable minority in India, accused of being responsible
for Partition and whose loyalties are often suspect (they are regularly accused, at times of
crises in particular, of being a fifth column of Pakistan) are the two main reasons for the
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sentiment of alienation felt by many Muslims in India. But as said before, the diasporic
condition may reinforce the hypersensitivity, this being another facet of the so-called
long-distance nationalism. Muslims in India in the past have kept a low profile, but they
no  longer  feel  the  need  to  do  so  after  migrating.  They  are  likely  to  become  more
vociferous in their denunciation of the violations of minority rights in India, regardless of
the actual size of the problem on the ground.
31 As for the reactions of Pakistanis to the Ayodhya affair and to the situation of Muslims in
India, many feel vindicated in their belief in an age-old hostility between Hindus and
Muslims,  and as  a  corollary  that  Partition was  more than justified.  At  any rate,  the
memory of Partition is still very alive among immigrant South Asians regardless of their
religious affiliation, but in particular among the Punjabis. It is worth noting that in spite
of their own very critical assessment of the condition of Muslims in India, Indian Muslims
in the diaspora express sometimes feelings of embarrassment over what they perceive as
the ‘over-solicitude’ of the Pakistanis in the way the latter react to events affecting Indian
Muslims. Interestingly, Muslims in India express similar sentiments when the Pakistani
government ‘interferes’ in their matters. The following comment was made in England,
but could apply to the US as well:
While the sympathy expressed by the Pakistanis is genuine no doubt, it is hard to
listen to such lamentations over and over again. The concern they have for their
religious brethren makes them believe that anyone who is not a Muslim is a Muslim
basher (Kalam circa 1993).
32 The second very important event which has led to a polarization between communities
(this time on national lines, i.e. Indians vs Pakistanis, regardless of religious affiliations) is
the nuclear tests conducted by both India and Pakistan in 1998. Though they aroused
mixed  feelings  in  both  communities  at  large,  they  were  nonetheless  hailed  with  an
unrestrained jubilation by a segment amongst them: the tests became the occasion for an
outburst of nationalist passions on the respective sides, of which the inevitable corollary
was an exacerbation of ethnic tensions. This polarization reached its peak the following
year during the Kargil war when Indian expatriates from the Silicon Valley sent a deluge
of  e-mails  against  Pakistan’s  infiltration into Indian territory,  which literally  flooded
Congressional offices. Interestingly, most Indian Muslims reacted either by celebrating
the Indian nuclear tests or by taking a pacifist stand and denouncing the tests conducted
by both countries. This epitomizes the fact that no matter the mixed feelings they may
nurture towards their home-country, in particular when they are in a diasporic situation,
those feelings do not translate into any significant kind of support for Pakistan as a
nation.17 This is, in our view, a good illustration of the overlapping of belongings and the
complex (re)negotiations of the different facets of identity Indian Muslim expatriates are
engaged in: they can adopt a ‘united’ stand with non-Muslim Indians, when their own
coreligionists are not adversely affected as witnessed in the case of the nuclear tests or
the Kargil  war,  else express annoyance over Pakistanis’  ‘ostensible’  concern as in the
example  of  the  Ayodhya  crisis.  In  other  instances  however,  Indian  Muslims  and
Pakistanis,  who  usually  go  to  the  same  mosques  and  hence  share  a  major  space  of
socialization and common identity formation, can mobilize for common political causes
when ‘neutral’ grounds are involved (like the war in Bosnia for instance). 
33 At any rate, it is worth noting that the spaces of confrontation are different in the United
States from what they were in the Subcontinent, or even from what they are in the UK:
streets are no longer the preferential places where communal passions are unleashed;
The Paradox of Religion: The (re)Construction of Hindu and Muslim Identities ...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 1 | 2007
10
they have been replaced by other spheres. The importance of temples and mosques in
(separate) community formation has been already mentioned; in addition, media, new
technologies (the Internet in particular), as shown by the dramatic increase in communal
newspapers and websites over the years and the extensive use of  e-mails during the
Kargil crisis for instance, as well as political lobbies18 are invested in the United States
with  a  new  (and  exclusive)  importance,  and  have  become  the  major  arenas  of
confrontation.  This  corroborates  Benedict  Anderson’s  theory  of  long-distance
nationalism, whereby the actors who indulge in transnational politics are not directly
affected by the consequences, as inter-ethnic conflicts in the United States remain fairly
relegated to the domain of the rhetoric and the discourse, while repercussions on the
ground (leading in particular to direct confrontations between communities) can be felt
in home countries, as in the Gujarat riots (see below). 
34 This is not to suggest however that streets in the US, as a public sphere where communal
sentiments would be expressed, have lost any significance. Much to the contrary, streets
can become ‘confessionalized’ spaces as shown not only by the frenetic construction of
religious  edifices,  already  mentioned,  but  also  by  the  increasing  number  of  ethnic
parades, Indian, Pakistani, Sikh, Muslim (as if Sikhs and Muslims were forming an ethnic
group), and processions during religious festivals, etc. But interestingly, in the few areas
where there is a relative concentration of South Asians (as compared to UK, South Asians
do not however live as much in ethnic enclaves), the relationships between South Asians
are not particularly strained; besides, their frictions, when they do exist, do not usually
degenerate into street-fights.  In addition to the daily interaction that may dilute the
conflictual logic, this situation can also be explained by the fact that these populations
tend to be socially homogeneous: those who live in ethnic enclaves usually belong to
underprivileged segments of the population. Such is the case for instance in Queens (New
York), where a fairly high number of South Asians hailing from diverse ethno-national
backgrounds live but sharing usually similar social conditions (Khandelwal 2002).  For
those populations, class issues tend to be endorsed with a greater importance than ethno-
national or ethno-religious considerations.19 As mentioned previously, competition and
conflicts, when they do take place, usually oppose South Asians to Hispanics or African-
Americans. Hence, the situation is fairly different from the UK. This perhaps is explained
by the fact that in the United States, South Asians form only a minority among other
migrants while in the UK they are one of the dominant minorities and are much more
involved than they are in the US, in competing to place demands and negotiate with the
British authorities for obtaining subsidies and other types of material gains. 
35 The  most  vociferous  promoters  of  the  reassertion  of  an  Indian  identity,  defined  as
necessarily and exclusively Hindu,  usually live in residential  suburbs that  are mostly
inhabited by White people, and their opportunities for daily interaction with other South
Asians are fairly limited (Khandelwal 2002). Or, they can be petit-bourgeois who are in a
process of or strongly willing to climb the social ladder, as are the newsstands’ owners of
Manhattan and motel owners. Interestingly, many of them are Gujaratis, who at any rate
form the largest regional group of Indians in the United States. This may be significant to
the extent to which the transformation of the State of Gujarat into a laboratory of the
Hindutva (Hinduness) forces had repercussions far beyond India. With this backlash, these
very Gujarati expatriates have contributed to the Hindutvaization of Gujarat by massively
financing  Hindu  nationalists,  as  was  revealed  during  the  Gujarat  riots  (see  below).
Regarding the aggressive promoters of a Pakistani or of a Muslim identity (defined in
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opposition to the Other, and the Other still being for many Hindu), they also tend to live
in areas where there is a low concentration of South Asians. Such is the case, for instance,
of Pakistani lobbyists (whose main activities are focussed on anti-Indian discourses) living
in the New York region.20
36 But  needless  to  say,  Hindus  as  well  as  Muslims are  far  from forming two internally
homogeneous  communities,  and  are  highly  fragmented  along  different  fault-lines:
sectarian,  regional,  linguistic,  socio-economic,  and so on. Though there have been an
increasing number of pan-Indian associations, many organizations have been formed on a
regional  basis:  Gujarati,  Punjabi,  Hyderabadi,  Bengali  (interestingly  but  not  so
surprisingly,  Bangladeshis  have formed separate organizations from the Bengalis  and
from other  South Asian Muslims  as  well).  Besides,  the  overlapping  of  identities  and
belongings is such that borders can be easily blurred. Some vectors that may usually be
dividing among immigrant  groups  can at  times  play  a  significant  bridging role,  like
language: if not at the organizational level, language can indeed be endorsed with this
function  at  a  more  individual  level:  Muslims,  Hindus  and  Sikhs  (regardless  of  their
religion but usually belonging to older generations) can share their love of Urdu and take
part in the same musha’ira or ghazal sessions.
37 Beyond this precise example, there are larger bridging vectors, like music, (qawwali is
particularly  popular  in  the  first  generation)  and  bhangra,  or  neo-bhangra (traditional
bhangra mixed with reggae or rap, extremely popular across generations, and particularly
appreciated by the youths). As for Bollywood, it still plays its role of bridging borders in
the diaspora, as it already does in the Subcontinent,21 regardless of age, sex, class, region,
language, religion, caste and so on.
 
Beyond religion: the actors of pacification
38 In reaction to this polarization and growing confrontational attitude, there has been an
increasing counter-activism enacted by a(nother)  segment  of  South Asians,  the  ‘self-
conscious’ actors of reconciliation in the diaspora. During the recent years, these actors
have come to play a fairly significant role in the United States. Admittedly, their circle
remains rather narrow: progressive activists are mostly found on university campuses
(both  students  and  faculty  members)  and  are  concentrated  in  a  limited  number  of
regions,  namely  New  York,  Boston,  Chicago  and  San  Francisco  (Misir  1996),  while
supporters of communal politics are more widespread and either hail from conservative
(fairly  well)  established  immigrant  communities  (professionals  and  businessmen  in
particular), or from groups of recent immigrants who experience economic, social and
psychological difficulties.
39 It does remain however that the number of progressive organizations has dramatically
increased in a span of few years; some of them explicitly militate in favour of harmony
and rapprochement between the different South Asian communities and for peace in the
Subcontinent, in particular between India and Pakistan. In the 1990s, there were already a
number of progressive organizations but for most their main objective was to defend the
interests of South Asians in the United States itself, across religious, national or regional
barriers. Some were focusing on particular segments of the population such as women
(organizations against domestic violence like Sakhi, Manavi, Apna Ghar, and so on), Dalits
(like  ambedkar.org,  New  Republic  India,  Dalit  Freedom  Network),  homosexuals  (like
South Asian Lesbian and Gay Association), taxi drivers (like Licensed Drivers Coalition),
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and so on. Others, like the team of SAMAR magazine (South Asian Magazine for Action
and Reflection), had a wider scope and deal with issues across gender or professional
lines. Gradually these organizations, while still being concerned with local issues, have
extended their activities toward the Subcontinent,  hence giving a more transnational
dimension to their concerns. But what is even more noteworthy is that the sheer number
of these organizations has significantly increased in a few years. Most or almost all of
them mix local concerns with transnational ones. Among them, we can mention: FOSA
(Friends of South Asia, created in 2001-2002 in the San Francisco Bay area), SALA (South
Asian Literature and Art Archive created in 2001), SAPAC (South Asia Progressive Action
Collective, based in Chicago), ASATA (Alliance of South Asians Taking Action) created in
2000 in the San Francisco Bay area,  and so on.  One of them deserves to be specially
mentioned: APSA, Action of Physicians of South Asia, created in July 2003. The creation of
this organization is indeed particularly interesting because Indian and Pakistani doctors
had  formed  separate professional  organizations  (like  AAPI,  American  Association  of
Physicians of Indian Origin, and APPNA, the Association of Pakistani Physicians of North
America),  and many members  of  these  organizations  have  been actively  involved in
lobbying campaigns focused on the hostility to the Other (Mohammad-Arif 2000). 
40 There are several reasons for the rise of these alternative organizations, some take their
roots in the change of the sociological profile of the diaspora, while others are more
related to recent ‘traumatic’ events that have acted as ‘moral shocks’ (Jasper & Poulson
1995)  for  many diasporic  South Asians.  Regarding the  change of  sociological  profile,
between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the following decade, there has been a
maturation of the second generation, which has come along with a questioning by the
youths but also by women, who had been so far marginalized,  of  the quasi-exclusive
supremacy  exerted  by  men  of  the  first  generation  over  Indian  and  Pakistani
organizations. These men, who acted as self-proclaimed community leaders and had so
far monopolized the whole community space, tended to (and still do) insist on a singular
identity, that of a Hindu, or a Muslim, or that of an Indian (but understood as necessarily
Hindu) or a Pakistani. Hence for the past few years, alternative community spaces have
emerged under the impulsion of women and youths (even though a significant fraction of
women  and  youths  are  also  engaged  in  movements  of  hindutvaization  and  re-
Islamization). These alternative spaces attract not only ‘true’ progressive militants who
defend particular causes but also other South Asians who are not necessarily politicized
but who are in search of spaces of entertainment (as remarkably described by Pnina
Werbner (2002) in the UK context) or of forums for artists of South Asian descent like
Voices of Resistance (‘an annual exploration and affirmation of South Asian Diasporic
identity through art’):22 these progressive South Asian organizations represent public
forums of celebration (through music and cinema in particular) not only of communal
harmony but of South Asian culture as well,  beyond the narrow national or religious
identity. Hence the whole fun and/or art dimension of the events, organized by these
associations,  plays  a  significant  role  in  attracting  South Asians  onto  common public
forums regardless of their regional, religious and other affiliations.
41 This calling into question of the hegemony of males of the first generation over South
Asian communities has coincided with ‘spectacular’ events which took place both in the
Subcontinent and in the United States: the nuclear tests and the threats of a nuclear war
between  India  and  Pakistan;  September  11  and  the  subsequent  and  unparalleled
discrimination against South Asians; finally the ghastly riots in Gujarat. Hence it is this
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conjunction between the rise of new actors on the diasporic public sphere and dramatic
events in both home-societies and the host-society, which explains the more aggressive
activism, as well as the growing legitimacy, of secular and progressive organizations over
the recent years. Some of these movements, like FOSA, founded in the wake of the nuclear
tests,  were  specifically  created  in  reaction  to  these  ‘dramatic’  events.  Yet,  this
competition between different  actors  of  conflictuality  on the  one  hand,  of  actors  of
reconciliation on the other is nothing new: it echoes a situation already observed in the
Subcontinent as well where radical Hindus and radical Muslims compete with feminists,
modernists and secularists for a control of the public space.
42 Two of  the  events  mentioned above deserve  special  attention:  September  11  and its
aftermath, and the riots in Gujarat. Before September 11, as compared to the Arabs, the
Pakistanis and Indian Muslims had the ‘advantage’ of being mistaken for Hindus, who
overall enjoy a positive image in the United States. Since September 11, the situation is
such  that  all  the  people  who  hail  from the  Subcontinent,  regardless  of  their  actual
religious background, including in highly cosmopolitan cities like New York, tend to be
regarded with suspicion because they are mistaken for  Muslims even when they are
Hindu or Sikh. This situation has generated different kinds of reactions: the first one,
which probably includes the majority of  the population,  has been to try as  much as
possible to differentiate oneself from Muslims: just after September 11, some Sikhs for
instance could be seen on TV showing photographs on CNN and explaining the difference
between the turban of the Sikhs and the turban of bin Laden; more generally speaking,
many have tried through various means to show that Hindus and Sikhs had nothing to do
with  Muslims.  But  other  people  on  the  contrary  have  seen  this  situation  as  an
opportunity  to  build  bridges  beyond religious  cleavages  and  to  try  to  find  common
platforms to face a situation of crisis together. Hence leaders of Sikh, Hindu and Muslim
organizations  held  several  common  meetings  with  American  representatives  in
Washington DC, and expressed together their concerns over the growing discrimination
against South Asians in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Besides these efforts at the political
level,  other  people  also  tried  to  ‘educate’  their  coreligionists  about  how  to  fight
discrimination, with a rhetoric about the importance of not being themselves in return
discriminatory.  I  thus  attended a  meeting  in  November  2001  organized by  two Sikh
lawyers who were explaining to the audience which was exclusively composed of Sikhs,
how to defend themselves against racist attacks, profiling in airports and so on; they were
strongly insisting on the importance of explaining ‘positively’ the Sikh religion to the
‘attacker’ (‘I am a Sikh and this is what Sikhism is about’) instead of just shouting ‘I am
not a Muslim’ (this implying ‘hence you are not targeting the right person’). More broadly
speaking, September 11 has engendered an awareness amongst some people, generated
by the perception of the Other, the ‘Other’ being here the host-society, of a common
identity, that of ‘South Asian’. The following statement of a young man just after 9/11 is
thus revealing: ‘We should be united among ourselves’, said Malik (interestingly, ‘Malik’ is
a name that can be given by Muslims, Hindu Punjabis and Sikh Punjabis alike). ‘We all
look the same to them, so let’s unite as one.’ It should be noted that if this (self)-definition
of  ‘South Asian’  or  ‘Asian’  generated by the perception of  the host-society  has  been
existing in the UK for a long time, this phenomenon is much more recent in the United
States, and seems to have been endorsed with significant importance since September 11.
And this goes well beyond the circle of progressive activists.
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43 The other major event of the recent years is the riots in Gujarat in February 2002, which
caused the death of 2000 people, mostly Muslims. The direct responsibility of the local
State in the riots was soon established. This event, reminiscent of the horrors of Partition,
engendered a fairly important mobilization in the United States, on the initiative of both
progressive organizations and Indian Muslim associations. In 2005, these organizations
achieved what  has  probably been one of  their  greatest  successes.  They were able  to
prevent the Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi, from coming to the United States.
Modi, who has been accused of being involved in the Gujarat riots, had been invited in
March 2005 at the annual convention of the Asian American Hotel Owners’ Association.
The AAHOA is largely dominated by the Gujaratis, and represents particularly small hotel
and motel owners. This invitation triggered off an important mobilization of about thirty
organizations  who  were  backed  by  a  dozen  more  based  in  the  United  States,  and
representing both Indian Muslims, civil rights groups, and intellectuals. They formed a
coalition  called  Coalition  Against  Genocide.  Following  this  mobilization,  the  US
government refused to grant Modi both a diplomatic visa and a business visa. Regarding
the diplomatic visa, it put forward the argument that Modi had been invited by an Indo-
American organization and not by the American government. As for the business visa, the
American authorities invoked a clause of the US Immigration and Nationality Act which
‘prohibits any government official who was responsible for any directly carried out at any
time, particularly severe violations of religious freedom’. The rejection of the visa was
followed  by  a  resolution  on  the  initiative  of  a  Democrat  representative,  asking  the
Congress to condemn ‘the conduct of Chief Minister Narendra Modi for his actions to
incite religious persecution and urging the United States to condemn all violations of
religious freedom in India’. We can of course wonder about the real motivations of the US
government and whether the latter would have adopted the same attitude had the BJP
still been in power; yet, the whole affair represents as symbolic as it may be a nonetheless
significant victory for progressive movements in America.23
44 South Asian secular forces in the US have very recently achieved another victory. This
regards a controversy over textbooks in California. The monitoring of the presentation of
Hinduism and Indian history in American school textbooks is an important goal of the
American Hindutva movement. In early 2005, two groups closely connected to the Sangh
Parivar,  the  Vedic  Foundation  and  the  Hindu  Educational  Foundation,  submitted
recommendations to the California Curriculum Commission for revisions of textbooks
and their treatment of ancient Indian history. In addition to removing stereotypes and
factual  errors,  the  groups  also  inserted  highly  contentious  changes,  like  removing
anything suggesting that caste still  determines the status of people in Indian society,
portraying Hinduism as very similar to Judaism and Christianity, making all non-Hindu
Indians foreigners, and so on. Initially, the Curriculum Commission came under so much
pressure from Hindutva forces who wrapped these changes in the vocabulary of minority
rights and equality, that the Commission accepted many of those changes.24 But those
controversial changes stirred such an opposition by academics and secular groups from
all  over  the  US  and  other  countries  that  the  California  State  Board  of  Education
overturned the changes.25 This is an interesting case of both the unabated activism of
Hindutva militants in the United States, even when the BJP has been on the decline in
India,  at the national level,  and the increasingly successful counter-activism of South
Asian secular forces.
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45 All  this  said,  it  does  remain  that  in  terms  of  mobilization,  nationalists  and
fundamentalists of all kinds still overshadow progressive and secular groups. It would be
sufficient to compare the number of people who came to the AAHOA meeting held in New
York that Narendra Modi could not physically attend (but his speech was retransmitted
by satellite), with the number of people who were demonstrating outside the building
against this meeting: 4000 vs 250.
 
Conclusion
46 South Asians in the United States have witnessed a polarization and an exacerbation of
their internal conflicts, particularly opposing Hindus to Muslims for a series of reasons
explored in this  article.  First,  so-called American multiculturalism tends to create or
reinforce  internal  group-boundaries.  Second,  the  very  process  of  migration,  across
countries, calls into question any type of identity that had been so far ‘taken for granted’,
and in the process religious lives are re-constructed while religion plays a crucial role in
ethnic formation. Migration also involves socio-economic and social mobility issues, and
even though these populations are not in direct competition with each other the same
way  as  they  can  be  in  the  Subcontinent,  they  do  share  a  common  experience  of
marginalization and stigmatization generated by dislocation, whose outcome is for some
immigrants  a tendency  to  find  solace  in  narrow  and  parochial  identities.  Equally
important is the role played by the respective leaderships, who, involved as they are in
power struggles, competition for resources and bids for (personal) recognition (both by
the host-society and by the ethnic community), will not hesitate to only lay the stress on
the respective differences and specificities and not on the common history that binds
these communities. These ethnic entrepreneurs will do so all the more willingly because
they are encouraged by the host-society to exhibit a homogenous culture. Neither is the
role played by openly communal organizations negligible in increasing the gap between
religious  groups.  Finally,  the  demonization  of  Muslims  in  the  United  States,  since
September 11, by the American government and by the American media urges the non-
Muslims to differentiate themselves from Muslims, and hence has not really contributed
to  improve  the  relationships  between the  two groups,  less  so  since  the  anti-Muslim
feelings  prevalent  in  the  United  States  fits  the  anti-Muslim  agenda  of  the  Hindutva
supporters (see Ingrid Therwath in this issue).
47 This  does not  prevent immigrants from being engaged in a complex web of  identity
(re)negotiations and labyrinthine alliances (along age,  gender,  professional,  linguistic,
religious … lines). In spite of the tendencies towards homogenization in the two major
religious groups in particular,  the overlapping of  identities,  strongly observed in the
Subcontinent is not lost in migration: while ‘traditional’ bridging factors like Bollywood,
remain alive after migration, others like neo-bhangra are even created in the diaspora.
48 Last but not least, a redefinition of the concept of South Asian seems to make its way in
the United States, partly unwillingly as well as deliberately. This notion had been vague
for  a  long  time  and  still  is  for  many  people,  including  the  directly  involved  ones,
particularly the second generation. Interestingly, some of the latter ‘discovered’ that they
were South Asian only after going through the American college application process (the
category ‘South Asian’ approximately appeared in the middle of the 1990s); hence, it is
the perception and the definition of host-society which can generate a sentiment and
self-awareness  of  a  common  belonging.  But  this  concept  of  ‘South  Asian’  has  also
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gradually taken on a more self-conscious, deliberate meaning, as shown by the increasing
number of organizations which have named themselves ‘South Asian’. These movements
and actors explicitly strive to erase the borders inherited from Partition, both in the
diaspora, as they exhort South Asian immigrants to bridge their differences (and for this
they use  in  particular  the  entertainment  and the ‘art’  arena),  and in  home-societies
where their activities attempt at a reconciliation between India and Pakistan. But as said
before, they are still overshadowed by the actors of conflictuality. 
49 At any rate, as this paper has attempted to show, the perpetuation, or even creation, of
differences, generated by the American policy of multiculturalism, can not only affect
‘broad’ ethnic groups (like Koreans vs. African-Americans or Hispanics vs. South Asians)
but, given the crucial role of religion in mainstream public space as well as in ethnic
identity formation, it can also have an impact on the self-perception and self-definition of
sub-groups within larger communities, and create internal group boundaries. The self-
conscious blurring of these boundaries, as enacted by a (small) progressive segment of
the  South  Asian  population,  which  gives  a  new  meaning  to  what  is  primarily  a
geographical  concept  in  the  Subcontinent,  partakes  of  the  same  logic:  identity
construction along community lines and not along individual lines as is (still) strongly
advocated in France, albeit with a reverse effect. This tells us of the importance of the
local context, in (over)determining the processes of identity (re)construction of ethnic
groups in a diasporic context.
50 This study raises another issue, that of religious groups tending to function as ethnic
groups, because despite the recognition of religion as an ‘acceptable’ identity marker in
the  United  States  (as  opposed  to  France  for  instance),  only  ethnicity  is  officially
considered as a valid group categorization (as seen in the census, in lobbying games, and
so on). Hence, under the impulse of their respective leaderships, ‘Hindus’ and ‘Muslims’
have now come to operate almost like ethnic groups, hence endorsing in some ways,
reshaping in others the categorizations put in place by the Americans.
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NOTES
1. I thank Jackie Assayag and Christophe Jaffrelot for their highly useful comments on earlier
drafts of this article.
2. It seems that Sikhs and Christians are over-represented as compared to their proportion in
India. Sikhs are estimated to include 10% of the total Indian population (as against hardly 2% in
India) and Christians 5% (as against slightly more than 2% in India) (Fenton 1988: 28). 
3. The following figures illustrate the degree of success of Indians in the US: according to the
1990 census, Indian-Americans had an average household income of 60,903 US dollars as against
the national median income of 38,885 US dollars. More than 87% of Indians had completed high
school and 58% had at least a bachelor degree. Over 5,000 Indians work as faculty members in
universities. There are no such figures available for Pakistanis. This is because, as opposed to
Indians they do not have a separate classification in the US census (they are listed as ‘others’ in
the larger Asian subgroup) but they also have been successful in different fields, in particular
medicine, business, and information and technology, albeit less noticeably than Indians. It should
however be kept in mind that the number of less privileged Indians and Pakistanis has been
growing steadily since the 1980s.
4. In addition to the immediate trigger of the Rodney King verdict (on April 29, 1992, a mostly
white jury acquitted four police officers accused in the videotaped beating of  black motorist
Rodney King),  there were many other  factors  cited as  reasons for  the unrest,  including:  the
extremely high unemployment among residents of South Los Angeles, which had been hit very
hard  by  the  nation-wide  recession;  a  long-standing  perception  that  the  Los  Angeles  police
engaged in racial profiling and used excessive force, and specific anger over the light sentence
given to a Korean shop-owner for the shooting of a young African-American woman.
5. This is in line with movements of revitalization of the religion like the Deobandi movement
(Metcalf 1982) on the Muslim side and the VHP on the Hindu side (Jaffrelot 1993).
6. The figure includes mosques built by non-South Asians.
7. I  will  define ethnic identity as a process of  construction or invention which incorporates,
adapts  and amplifies  historical  memories,  cultural  attributes  and pre-existing  solidarities,  in
order  to  create  an  internal  cohesion,  and  to  mark  out  distinctive  cultural  territory.  This
definition is a synthesis of those offered by Brass (1991: 19) and Bodnar (1985: xvi).
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8. Indian universities lack facilities for extra-curricular activities and counselling services. This
void  as  been  efficiently  fulfilled  by  the  RSS,  which  in  turn  exerts  an  influence  on  students
(Mazumdar 2003).
9. It should be noted that the first transnational Hindu institutions in the US were the Vedanta
societies,  established after  Vivekananda participated in the World Parliament of  Religions in
Chicago in 1893 (Mazumdar 2003).
10. It  should  be  however  noted  that  whereas  the  JI  in  Pakistan  strongly  advocates  the
establishment of an Islamic State, ICNA has eliminated this major point from its agenda.
11. This  includes those who may not  identify  themselves  as  Indians,  like  migrants  from the
Caribbean and from East Africa, but they are nonetheless of Indian origin. At any rate, the VHP
uses Hinduism as a bridge to link the immigrants from Britain, Africa, Guyana, Fiji and so on. 
12. According  to  Carol  Stone,  immigrants  from Asia  make  up  11.5% of  the  total  number  of
Muslims living in the US as opposed to 30.2% of African-Americans and 28.4% of Arabs (Stone
1991: 28). However, according to the American Muslim Council, a political organization based in
Washington, immigrants from South Asia alone make up 24.4% of the total Muslim population, as
against 42% of African-Americans and only 12.4% of Arabs (Numan 1992: 16).
13. For more details, see Mohammad-Arif (2002a).
14. As a tax-exempt religio-cultural organization, the VHP-A is officially not supposed to pursue
a political  agenda; but it  does so either indirectly,  or through the medium of some officially
political  organizations,  like  the  FHA for  instance  (Federation of  Hindu  Associations)  (Kurien
2001).
15. That is not true of African-Americans.
16. Hindus and their temples had been indeed targeted after the bomb attacks.
17. Fieldwork conducted in May 1999 in New York.
18. See Ingrid Therwath in this issue and Mohammad-Arif (2000).
19. However, other studies point out that the Hindutva ideology also has its supporters among
recent immigrants who experience economic, social and psychological difficulties (Kurien 2004,
Mazumdar 2003).
20. Fieldwork conducted in May 1999 in New York.
21. Despite the fact that in the early 2000s, there had been a tendency to make Hindi films that
were  ostensibly  hostile  to  Pakistan,  like  Gadar (2001)  and Maa  Tujhe  Salaam (2001).  With the
current peace process between India and Pakistan, Indian film directors have stopped making
this kind of movies.
22. See http://www.sapac.org/sapacwebpage_files/Page466.htm
23. There  was  an  ‘interesting’  clash  between  two  Indian  American  expatriates  at  the  latest
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (January 2006), when a representative of the ‘Coalition against Genocide’,
Satyanath Chowdary, protested against the presentation of the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman award
to the President of the Federation of Indian Associations, Sudhir Parikh. Chowdary’s contention
was that the FIA had planned a procession in honour of Narendra Modi (a Gujarat Gaurav rath
yatra) on the streets of New York City if Modi was granted a visa to the US, and hence, as a
‘communally-oriented’ person, Sudhir Parikh did not deserve the award.
24. Tehelka. 2006. in Harsh Kapoor (South Asia Citizen Web), 4 February.
25. More than a hundred of South Asian scholars from across the United States and more than
fifty American and international Indologists,  as well  as secular community organizations and
private individuals,  wrote to the Board of California, protesting the changes proposed by the
Hindutva groups, Harsh Kapoor, 9 March 2006 (South Asia Citizen Web).
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ABSTRACTS
In the process of (re)constructing their identities in an alien society, South Asians have tended to
give to religion a significant importance. This salience of religion owes as much to the dislocation
and the  stigmatization engendered  by  the  migration  experience  as  to  the  local  context,  the
United States, who, while promoting a policy of multiculturalism, sees religion as an ‘acceptable’
identity marker. Drawing on this process, this article examines the implications on the inter-
ethnic relationships, in particular between Hindus and Muslims (both Indian and Pakistani), as
two  opposite  and  competing  trends  are  underway:  on  the  one  hand,  separate,  if  not
confrontational, Hindu and Muslim identities are arising, while on the other hand, a South Asian
identity, ignoring the borders of Partition, is shaping up.
The Paradox of Religion: The (re)Construction of Hindu and Muslim Identities ...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 1 | 2007
22
